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June 12th

  • Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Its Nuclear Deterrent Force (KCNA) (October 18 2003): But the Agreed Framework remains a dead document as it was completely ditched by the U.S. The core issue of the AF is the U.S. commitment to provide the DPRK with light water reactors in return for the latter's freeze of its nuclear facilities. . . . The Bush administration openly refused to recognize the entity of the DPRK . . . listed the DPRK as part of an "axis of evil" and a target of its preemptive nuclear attack . . . and completely scrapping the main articles of the AF. . . . Kelly . . . asserted without any evidence that the DPRK has pushed forward the "enriched uranium program" . . . When an appropriate time comes, the DPRK's increased nuclear deterrent force will be proved in practice.

June 9th

  • STEP-BY-STEP NUCLEAR CONFIDENCE BUILDING ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: WHERE DO WE START? (B-K Kim) (2000): . . . The Agreed Framework of 1994 between DPRK and USA seems to bring a nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula under control. Supplying two light water reactors (LWRs) and heavy fuel oil while all graphite reactor facilities in the DPRK remain frozen, which is unprecedented in non-proliferat ion history, is nevertheless proceeding with limited success. . . .This paper intends to review the crucial stages managed by two Koreas, USA, KEDO and IAEA during the past decade, possibility of improvements in the Agreed Framework, KEDO LWR construction milestones with respect to the non-proliferat ion goals, and the challenging IAEA verification roles. Specific steps which are being taken by two Koreas and concerned entities are reviewed and recommended towards creating proper atmosphere for nuclear confidence building in the Korean Peninsula.

June 8th

June 7th

  • Bush Administration Responsible for Delay in Solution to Nuclear Issue (KCNA) (October 8 2004): . . . On October 1 Bush in a TV face-to-face debate asserted that the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework (AF) was scrapped because the DPRK has pursued "highly enriched uranium program" and that the U.S. has promoted multi-lateral talks such as the six-party talks rather than bilateral talks between the DPRK and the U.S. because the former has not honored bilateral commitments. This is profound confusion of the right and the wrong. . . . [T]he Bush administration totally negated the AF and has since kept designating the DPRK as part of "an axis of evil" and "target of a preemptive nuclear attack" over the past four years . . . The DPRK side . . clarified that it was entitled to possess weapons more powerful than nuclear weapons . . . The core point of the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework is the U.S. commitment to provide light-water reactors to the DPRK in return for its nuclear freeze. But the construction of LWRs which the U.S. had promised to provide to the DPRK ended in its groundwork. . . .
  • DPRK FM Spokesman Demands U.S. Compensate for Political and Economic Losses (KCNA) (November 28 2005): The U.S. and the KEDO made a final decision on Nov. 22 to completely stop the construction of LWRs which has been held off for the past nearly two years. The KEDO thus ceased to exist and the construction of LWRs came to a final stop. This is what the DPRK has already anticipated. As a matter of fact, the Bush administration has suspended the construction of the reactors for the nearly two years since it took the measure to stop the provision of heavy fuel oil in a bid to scrap the AF. The final stop to the construction of LWRs was, therefore, just a matter of time. The U.S. has thus completely pulled out of the AF, causing huge economic losses to the DPRK. All the facts go to clearly prove that the DPRK was quite just when it demanded the U.S. abide by the principle of simultaneous actions in handling the issue of the latter's provision of LWRs and the former's abandonment of its nuclear program, a physical groundwork for building confidence between the two countries. . . .
  • Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Issue of Implementation of February 13 Agreement (KCNA July 6 2007): After the settlement of the [BDA] issue . . . the DPRK is implementing its commitments under the agreement much earlier than the promised time and order. . . . the DPRK allowed a delegation of the [IAEA] to visit the DPRK just one day after the completion of the fund remittance . . . to make up for the loss of time, substantially kicking off the process to suspend the operation of its nuclear facilities. The . . . agreement calls for providing 50,000 tons of heavy oil to the DPRK in the same period, but . . . the total quantity is expected to be completed early in August. . . . the DPRK is now earnestly examining . . . suspending the operation of its nuclear facilities earlier than expected, that is from the moment the first shipment of heavy oil . . . Nevertheless, some elements are now spreading misinformation that the DPRK is raising a new demand . . . This indicates that the forces displeased with the smooth implementation of the agreement are still at work.
  • Full Implementation of February 13 Agreement Depends on U.S. and Japan (KCNA July 15 2007): A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry . . . said: The DPRK suspended the operation of the above-said nuclear facilities on July 14, the day the first shipment of 50,000 tons of heavy oil arrived and allowed members of the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor the facilities according to the agreement. Taking into consideration the fact that the DPRK was supposed to suspend the operation of its nuclear facilities from the time 50,000 tons of heavy oil has been provided according to the February 13 agreement, this means the DPRK's earlier fulfillment of its promise than scheduled and a manifestation of its good faith towards the agreement. The provision of substitute energy including heavy oil is by no means "aid" ; in the form of charity but compensation for the DPRK's suspension of its nuclear facilities and the activities of the IAEA in Nyongbyon are not "inspecti on" but limited to verification and monitoring.

June 6th

  • DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Issue of Implementation of October 3 Agreement (KCNA) (January 4 2008): It is beyond Dec. 31, 2007, the deadline set in the Oct. 3 agreement. It is regrettable that points agreed there remain unimplemented except the disablement of the DPRK's nuclear facilities. The disablement started early in November last year and all the operations were completed within the "technolo gically possible scope" as of Dec. 31. At present, the unloading of spent fuel rods scheduled to be completed in about 100 days is underway as the last process. However, the delivery of heavy fuel oil and energy-related equipment and materials to the DPRK, commitments of other participating nations, has not been done even 50 per cent. The U.S. has not honored its commitments to cross the DPRK off the list of "sponsors of terrorism" ; and stop applying [TWEA] . . . Now that other participating nations delay the fulfillment of their commitments, the DPRK is compelled to adjust the tempo of the disablement of some nuclear facilities on the principle of "action for action."
  • DPRK Will Not Regard Japan as Party to Six-Party Talks (KCNA) (December 6 2008): What matters is that Japan persistently and impertinently insists on its participation in the talks though it is refusing to fulfill its commitment despite the fact that the implementation of the October 3 agreement is at its final phase. . . . It is only Japan out of those parties that has not done anything to fulfill its commitment but is still refusing to do so. It is the assertion of Japan that it will not fulfill any commitment related to its economic compensation under the agreement reached at the six-party talks unless there is progress in the solution of the "abductio n issue" between the DPRK and Japan.

May 30th

  • Press Communiqué of the Heads of Delegation Meeting of The Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks (July 12 2008): I. The six parties agreed to establish a verification mechanism; II. The six parties agreed to establish a monitoring mechanism; III. The Parties formulated a timetable for economic and energy assistance along with disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. Disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities by the DPRK and the remaining heavy fuel oil (HFO) and non-HFO assistance to the DPRK by other parties will be fully implemented in parallel. All parties will work to complete their HFO and non-HFO assistance to the DPRK by the end of October 2008. The United States and Russia will work to complete the provision of their remaining share of HFO assistance to the DPRK by the end of October 2008. China and the ROK will work to sign with the DPRK binding agreements for the provision of their remaining share of non-HFO assistance by the end of August 2008. The DPRK will work to complete the disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities by the end of October 2008.

May 11th

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